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The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 designated the Department of Defense
(DoD) "as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." The Act
also tasks DoD with expanded support to civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's)
involved in drug interdiction. According to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
The Department of Defense is an enthusiastic participant in the nation's drug
control effort. We have significant resources at our disposal. We can make a
substantial contribution to our national effort if we use our assets intelligently and
efficiently. [Ref. 1: p. 41
To these ends, the President's National Drug Control Strategy for 1991 estimated the
DoD budget for drug interdiction at nearly $1.1 billion, more than double the actual
expenditures for 1989. Obviously, the potential contributions by DoD are being taken
very seriously.
In 1988, the RAND Corporation developed the Simulation of Adaptive Response
(SOAR) model to analyze the effect of military involvement in drug interdiction. SOAR
is a stochastic network simulation of drug smuggling involving theoretical routes for drug
shipments and the response of smugglers to being interdicted. Expanded involvement of
the military in drug interdiction was evaluated by examining the effect that increased
interdiction probability on the theoretical routes might have on the import price of illegal
drugs. The conclusions of the authors of the RAND study (Gordon Crawford, Peter
Reuter, et al.) were not heartening. Although the limitations of the SOAR model caused
it to be biased toward successful interdiction, it was found that "interdiction must be very
stringent indeed to greatly affect U.S. drug consumption." [Ref. 2: p. 73]
However, the model is simplistic in its approach to smuggling routes and the presence of
interdiction forces. Routes are not associated with actual geographic areas due to a lack
of available data, while interdiction assets are represented solely by a probability of
interdiction on the generic routes. This simplicity leaves room for expansion of the model
and further analysis.
B. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
Government-sponsored studies prior to that undertaken by RAND did not
concentrate on the adaptation of smugglers, nor explicitly examine the potential for
military contribution to the drug interdiction program [Ref. 3: p. 4]. As part
of a comprehensive study, SOAR was designed to aid in a policy analysis of the overall
interdiction program.
As a policy tool, SOAR did not require a geographic structure or specific
representation of interdiction assets. For this reason, SOAR is not useful in operational
planning or analysis. RAND's conclusions, at a policy level, indicate that military
involvement in drug interdiction may have limited effectiveness [Ref. 3: p. 130].
However, the Department of Defense has a major role in the program, and would benefit
from the availability of an analytic tool which could be used to evaluate the effects of
operational planning and to explore, with a consistent measure, the effectiveness of
different force and capability alternatives.
Interdiction problems are frequently modeled as flow networks for which
optimization methods are used to determine which arcs or nodes should be cut or
removed to provide an optimum result. In the case of a smuggling network, transit routes
may be represented by arcs which are not well defined, or are completely unknown to the
interdictors, making it difficult to entirely sever the arc. Even if it were possible, the
smugglers themselves will eventually realize that the arc has been cut and will move to
another route, adapting their methods to the interdiction. The SOAR model simulates this
type of response on the part of drug smugglers, making it a fairly obvious choice to
measure the effectiveness of interdiction on a smuggling network.
Because routes used by smugglers may not be clearly defined, it is unrealistic to
merely place assets on arcs representing segments of the routes. By developing a
geographic structure for the routes, assets can be located by latitude and longitude, and
the effects of assets on the routes (i.e., the probability of interdiction on routes) can be
measured as a function of their range from the routes. This also would allow assets to
affect multiple routes, for example, routes passing through a geographically restricted
area, or chokepoint. Finding the optimum locations for assets relative to a smuggling
network with stochastic flows will be difficult. As the locations of assets change, flows
through the routes will also change, resulting in local and global optima which vary with
the locations of assets. There are also likely to be many such optima, a result of different
assets contributing the same probability of interdiction to routes or being located in
positions previously tested by other assets. In addition, the number of possible locations
for assets is infinite, requiring some control over the locations tested if discrete
optimization is to be used. This control must include geographically feasible areas, but
should also reflect operational constraints, such as a requirement for certain assets to
operate within a set range from each other or a base, and political constraints, such as
foreign airspace or waters restrictions.
An optimization model with the properties described in this analysis, which retains
enough realism to be considered valid, would be of great benefit at the operational level
of the military drug interdiction program.
C. METHODOLOGY
We will propose a solution to the need for an analytical tool which may be used for
analysis and planning at the operational level of the military drug interdiction program.
An exploration of the use of simulated annealing to optimize the location of counter-
narcotics assets with respect to a drug smuggling network is presented. The objective
function is an outcome of the modified SOAR model, in which the routes used by the
smugglers are modeled with a geographical structure, and the physical location of
interdiction assets (eg. ships, aircraft, aerostat balloons, observation posts, etc.) are used
to determine the probability of interdiction in an area. From the SOAR model we extract
the total cost to smugglers, a measure of effectiveness for one major goal of the overall
drug interdiction program, reduction in consumption of illegal drugs. Interdiction raises
the risks involved with drug smuggling, thereby increasing the costs associated with
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personnel pay, equipment and drug replacement, etc. Eventually, this results in higher
consumer prices for drugs. Economically, higher prices should cause a decrease in
demand for drugs in the long run, that is, lower consumption by Americans. Increased
crime among addicts to compensate for higher prices is not addressed.
Use of SOAR as the objective function evaluator in a model which exhibits
numerous local and global optimal asset locations eliminates the potential use of gradient-
optimization methods. It is for this reason that we chose to apply simulated annealing
as the optimization method to maximize the total cost to the smugglers.
D. SCOPE
This thesis briefly discusses the flow of cocaine from South and Central America
into the southern United States, and the role the Department of Defense plays in
interdiction efforts within this geographical area.
The model presented is capable of evaluating the use of assets in the Atlantic,
Pacific and Southwest Border regions; however, for the numerical results presented in this
thesis, only routes and assets in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are examined. Much
of the information that is available about known smuggling routes and the assets involved
in counter-narcotics operations is highly classified. In the interest of maintaining an
unclassified example, some data used in the model is taken from the original SOAR
model, while information on smuggling routes and counter-narcotics assets is intended to
be representative only, and should not be construed as data representing actual
circumstances.
II. THREAT AND INTERDICTION EFFORTS OVERVIEW
A. CURRENT THREAT OF ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
A number of indicators show that progress has been made in the war against drugs.
Overall drug use, drug-related medical emergencies, and student attitudes toward drug use
have all declined past the goals set in the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy, shown
in Table 1. [Ref. 4: p. 5]
Table 1 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY NATIONAL OBJECTIVES: Statistical
significance ranges from 1 to 30%.
GOAL ACTUAL
CURRENT OVERALL DRUG USE - 10% - 11%
CURRENT ADOLESCENT DRUG USE - 10% - 13%'
OCCASIONAL COCAINE USE - 10% - 29%





CURRENT ADOLESCENT COCAINE USE - 20% -49%
DRUG-RELATED MEDICAL EMERGENCIES - 10% - 18%
STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARD DRUG USE - 10% - 28%
Cocaine-specific indicators showed decreased purity and significantly higher prices
in many areas of the country for the past year. Also, since 1985, "... reported current
cocaine use (use in the past month) decreased some 72 percent."
[Ref. 5: p. 1]
The effect on smugglers themselves may be deduced from the surrender of a
number of Colombian drug lords and the level of effort smugglers put forth to get their
product into the United States. Examples of this effort include the tunnel between
Mexico and Arizona discovered in May 1990 [Ref. 6: p. Al] and the
occasionally high tech hiding places used in vehicles, boats, and aircraft.
On the other hand, many problems still exist which illuminate the threat to national
security declared by President Reagan in 1986. Drug-related violence and murders remain
at high levels within the United States, as does the amount of cocaine being produced
throughout South America. Table 2 displays production levels for the three major
producing countries from 1988 to 1990, the last year for which data was available.
Table 2 COCAINE PRODUCTION ESTIMATE: Potential Cocaine HC1 Production by Country




PERU 242 440-468 440-473
BOLIVIA 112 264-458 259-435
COLOMBIA 43 77 72
TOTAL 397 781-996 771-980
Smugglers' high tech methods display their increasing adaptability to interdiction
efforts, as well as the effects of interdiction. Some smugglers are showing that they are
willing (or crazy enough) to take on interdiction forces, as evidenced by incidents along
the border with Mexico where smugglers have exchanged small arms fire with U.S.
military forces [Ref. 7: p. 1], and the attempt in April 1990 by smugglers
linked to the Medellin cartel to buy Stinger missiles [Ref. 8: p. 3].
The evolution of narco-terrorism may be proof enough that we are indeed facing
a war which must be fought by our armed forces outside the United States. Many
revolutionary/terrorist organizations, such as M-19 and FARC in Colombia and Shining
Path in Peru, are intimately linked to the drug trade, forming the basis for this narco-
terrorism. These groups have shown decided anti-American leanings, and have used
violence and threats against high level U.S. officials. One-time M-19 leader Ivan Mariano
Ospina said in December 1984, "May these threats be carried out and may they be carried
out in the entire world against the rapacious imperialism that lives at the cost of misery
of exploited people...." [Ref. 9: pp. 36,37] Even state leaders have
been involved, most recently illuminated by General Noriega in Panama, but also
including Fidel Castro who has acknowledged the use of cocaine as a weapon, "We are
going to make the people up there (the United States) white, white with cocaine [Ref. 9:
P- 32]."
Clearly, there are some signs of success in the drive to reduce illegal drug
trafficking and abuse. However, it is also plain that much more effort is required in all
phases of the war on drugs before the situation can be considered under control, let alone
resolved. Involvement of the Department of Defense in reducing the flow of drugs into
this country is only one part of the overall struggle, but, as Secretary Cheney said, the
military can have a great impact in this effort.
B. WHAT IS DOD'S INVOLVEMENT NOW?
Since the Department of Defense's first, somewhat reluctant, involvement in
counter-narcotics in the 1970's, the military has been called upon for increasing support
each year. The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 presented DoD with a primary role
in the drug war. We now see all segments of the military accepting counter-narcotics
assignments, including operational missions, such as ship and aircraft patrols with
embarked law enforcement personnel, intelligence gathering and surveillance, and material





CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCSOUTH CINCFOR NORAD
JTF4 JTF5 JTF6
Figure 1 DoD Counter-narcotics Chain of Command.
Obviously there is high-level attention being paid to the problem. The three Joint
Task Forces command the military assets involved in actual day-to-day interdiction
operations.
1. Joint Task Force 4
Located in Key West, Florida, JTF4 is in charge of operations in the Atlantic
area of responsibility (AOR). As the first Joint Task Force, their mission included the
creation of a joint fusion center for tactical intelligence and the communications necessary
to assemble the data and provide a finished product to all users. JTF4 conducts their own
detection and monitoring operations in the Atlantic AOR, and coordinates the operations
of other agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service and local law enforcement
activities.
Although JTF4 has no dedicated assets, they do have tactical control of
various personnel, ships, patrol and intercept aircraft, and intelligence collecting assets
assigned from other DoD commands, the Coast Guard and Customs Service.
[Ref. 10: p. 78]
2. Joint Task Force 5
Located in Alameda, California, JTF5 has a similar responsibility and mission
in the Pacific AOR as that of JTF4 in the Atlantic. They conduct organic operations to
detect and monitor aircraft and surface vessels suspected of smuggling, as well as
coordinating other agencies' operations within their AOR. JTF5's mission includes
integrating into the intelligence communications network and providing drug-related
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intelligence to law enforcement agencies as appropriate. [Ref. 11] As is the case
with JTF4, JTF5 has no dedicated assets, but takes tactical control of various assets
assigned from DoD commands, the Coast Guard and Customs Service.
3. Joint Task Force 6
Located at Ft. Bliss, Texas, JTF6 has a much different mission from that of
JTF's 4 and 5. Specifically, "Joint Task Force Six plans and coordinates all DoD support
requested by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies within the Southwest
Border region." [Ref. 12]
Requests for support usually come through Operation Alliance, an agency
comprised of representatives from Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies of
the Southwest Border states: Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Support
provided includes observation posts, reconnaissance, terrain denial operations designed
to deter smugglers from using areas along the border, training teams, military drug
detection dogs, and construction. Personnel from all military services and various
National Guard units have been called upon to perform these functions.
C. WHERE MAY DOD'S INVOLVEMENT LEAD?
There are as many different opinions concerning DoD's future involvement in drug
interdiction as there are people contemplating it. These opinions range from complete
disassociation to complete involvement in all aspects, not just detection and monitoring.
Many rational, and some not so rational, arguments are given for both extremes and
everything in between.
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One of the main arguments against the use of military forces in counter-narcotics
is the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1385), which prohibits the direct
use of military forces for civil law enforcement activities within the United States.
Because of this law, military forces involved in drug interdiction operations may not
perform search and seizure or make arrests. The military is limited to its monitoring and
detection mission and support of law enforcement activities.
Another strong argument is that drug interdiction operations have a detrimental
effect on DoD's primary mission to maintain a military capable of fighting a war to
defend the U.S. or its interests. This argument contends that the fight against drugs is not
truly a war, and that performing area patrols and ship boardings, detection and intercept
of slow moving aircraft, and patrolling a border area are not suitable training operations
for the military. Following the end of the Cold War (i.e., the reduction of the Soviet
threat) drug smuggling takes its place among "principle threats ... that replace the old
Soviet threat." [Ref. 13: p. 18] This means that drug interdiction
operations need no longer be construed merely as training evolutions, but are actually part
of the military's primary mission.
A third argument is the cost of military drug interdiction operations. It was
estimated that the Air Force spent approximately $433,000 per drug bust in 1986.
[Ref. 14: p. 7] Many believe that the $1 billion-plus military drug
interdiction budget could be better spent on education and treatment programs. These
programs are extremely important, since interdiction alone cannot halt the problem of
drug abuse. However, education and treatment are more effective when drugs are more
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expensive and less readily available. "Most leaders of prevention and treatment programs
recognize this; their task is made easier when drug enforcement works."
[Ref. 15: p. 3] The goal of interdiction is to "complement and support our
international drug control activities and domestic law enforcement programs, ... to create
an integrated supply reduction program." [Ref. 15: p. 65] Interdiction functions not only
to seize drugs destined for the U.S., but to act as a deterrent to potential drug smugglers,
and to force the price of illegal drugs to rise through increased risks the smugglers face.
In addition, "Interdiction provides a highly visible sign to other nations of U.S. interest
in reducing drug use." [Ref. 3: p. 2] This is a typical extension of the age-old Navy
mission of showing the flag. Thus, the cost per seizure of military interdiction operations
does not encompass the whole military contribution to the overall drug control strategy.
Plainly, the military has an important role to play in combatting the drug problem
faced by the United States. While no one wants to see the military take on civilian law
enforcement roles, DoD has the manpower, assets, technology, and money to assist and
supplement Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in reducing the supply of
drugs.
While DoD maintains its role in detection and monitoring of illegal drugs entering
the country, there are many who are pushing for an even greater military involvement.
In 1990, Senator Mitch McConnel (R-KY) proposed a plan for shooting down suspected
airborne smugglers who refuse to land for inspection [Ref. 16: p. A 19].
Although this plan was not put into effect, it did have a large amount of support.
Military and LEA personnel are providing training and technical assistance for anti-drug
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and counterterrorist forces in a number of production and transit countries. Operation
Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands (OPBAT), a multinational strike force in place
since 1983, has been very successful in preventing smuggling flights into the Bahamas.
It is certainly conceivable that similar strike forces could be established with other
countries.
The completion of the aerostat balloon network and the Caribbean Basin Radar
Network, as well as proposed over-the-horizon radar systems, would significantly increase
the ability to detect and monitor air traffic in smuggling areas, and act as a deterrent to
smugglers. Aerostats are tethered radar-equipped balloons, flown at about 10,000 feet,
which "provide surveillance of oceanic and land areas right down to the surface."
[Ref. 17: p. 7], with a range of approximately 200 nautical miles. The
Caribbean Basin Radar Network is a series of ground based radars designed to provide
nearly complete coverage of the Caribbean basin. Figure 2 displays the proposed
coverage of the aerostat network [Ref. 18: p. 84].
RADM Walter Leland, USCG, said, "We know that when the aerostats are flying
the traffic stops." [Ref. 19: p. 7] However, there are widely differing
reports on the operational reliability of the aerostat balloons. Some Air Force and
Customs Service officials call the system too expensive and fragile, claiming the balloons
are not operational more than 60% of the time because of severe weather and
maintenance problems [Ref. 20: p. 15]. At the same time, Pentagon
figures showed the balloons to be operational 70-75% of the time.












Figure 2 Aerostat Radar Network.
these systems, in turn making it harder to get funding to continue and expand the
program.
Finally, there have been a number of popular novels recently published which
provide more speculation about the possibilities of the military's future role in drug
interdiction. Most notable of these are Tom Clancy's Clear and Present Danger and Dale
Brown's Hammerheads.
Although many widely ranging proposals for military involvement in counter-
narcotics and numerous arguments against any use of the armed forces in drug
interdiction exist, with the current trend toward downsizing the armed forces it is difficult,
if not impossible, to predict exactly what DoD's future role in the nation's drug control
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strategy will be. It is fairly certain however, that the U.S. military will continue to be
involved. A recent report by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, foresees the continuation of a military role:
The drug problem must be attacked from both sides -- both the demand for drugs
and the supply of drugs must be reduced.... Although the United States will
continue to rely primarily on nonmilitary means in its effort to curtail the
international trade in drugs, Americans will also want U.S. military forces engaged
in the struggle with drug traffickers, primarily in an interdiction role.
[Ref. 13: p. 17]
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ID. SIMULATION MODEL
A. THE ORIGINAL SOAR MODEL.
1. Background.
The Simulation of Adaptive Response (SOAR) model is part of a RAND
Corporation study on the drug interdiction program, undertaken at the request of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in February 1986. This study culminated with the
publication of analysis results in three RAND reports.
The primary conclusion of RAND's effort was that:
Increasing drug interdiction efforts are not likely to greatly affect the availability
of cocaine in the United States. ...This conclusion is driven primarily by the small
share of total drug distribution costs that are accounted for by the smuggling sector.
Only about 10 percent of the final price of cocaine comes from smuggling costs and
profits. [Ref. 3: p. xi]
This conclusion does not take into account other reasons for military involvement in drug
interdiction, such as those discussed in the previous chapter. It does, however, suggest
that the need exists for a tool to be used in counter-narcotics analysis. RAND's SOAR
model provides a reasonable starting point for developing such a tool.
2. Model Description.
SOAR is a dynamic network simulation which allows drug smugglers a
number of air, sea, and land smuggling routes. These routes are generic in that they are
not associated with particular geographic routes. The route used for a particular shipment
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of drugs is probabilistically selected, depending on the costs of shipping drugs via that
route and the expected risk costs for shipping via the method associated with that route
based on a perceived probability of the shipment being seized. This probability is
estimated by a time-weighted history of unsuccessful shipments on that route, and will
change with time as shipments succeed or are interdicted.
Time between shipments is an exponential random variable with an input
mean. The quantity of each shipment is an input constant, as are the capacity and costs
of the routes and shipping methods. SOAR does not attempt to model the adaptation of
changing shipment sizes in response to interdiction severity. The capacity of the route
and the size of the shipment are used to determine the number of trips that each shipment
will require. These trips occur on the same route at the same time, leading to a saturation
factor which increases the probability that the shipment is seized.
Interdiction in SOAR is modelled by a general probability of interdiction for
each route. "Military resources are treated...simply as means for augmenting particular
activities, thereby raising the probability of success in those activities." [Ref. 3: p. 8]
This probability is an input value and can be changed for predetermined time periods
(phases). When multiple trips are required, the probability of interdiction on the route,
for that shipment, is increased as a result of the saturation factor.
The smugglers' overall goal is to ship as large a quantity of drugs as possible
at their perceived lowest cost. Costs to the smuggler include the cost of the drug,
operating costs for the method of shipment, the cost of replacing lost assets if a shipment
is seized, and pay to personnel. Smuggling personnel are assumed to be risk averse,
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therefore pay is assumed to change as the square of the perceived risk involved in using
a particular route. Increasing interdiction rates will affect the overall cost to the
smugglers by raising each of these costs.
For their model, the RAND authors attempted to estimate:
• Quantities shipped, by route, in a given year.
• Number of shipments, by route, in a given year.
• Number of vessels identified as suspicious, by route, in a given year. Of those, the
number pursued, by route in a given year. Of those, the number resulting in
seizures, by route, in a given year.
• Estimates of the compensation resulting from the likelihood of prison.
• Estimates of smugglers' nonrisk compensation and profits. [Ref. 2: p. 9]
As can be expected, little concrete data was available, resulting in the use of informed
guesses for many of the input parameters.
Output of the model includes an echo of the input parameters and the statistics
described in Appendix A, Sections A. 2. and B.l. respectively. The output is an average
of an input number of runs desired. Ten runs were used in the RAND analysis, providing
"an adequately precise estimate of the overall means, especially compared with the
imprecision of some of the input data and some of the assumptions incorporated in the
model." [Ref. 2: p. 24] This output was not used in our analysis, but is included in the
appendix for information.
Computational details of the SOAR model are described in Chapter IV of
Simulation of Adaptive Response, and are reasonably easy to interpret from the model
itself.
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B. THE SOAR SIMULATION AS THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION EVALUATOR.
1. Measures of Effectiveness.
In evaluating drug interdiction efforts, many measures of effectiveness have
been proposed. Civilian law enforcement agencies are concerned with numbers of
seizures and smugglers prosecuted. News reports regularly include the street value of
drugs seized. Because of its unique role of detection and monitoring and support to law
enforcement, and the fact that the armed forces are prohibited from direct participation
in the arrest and seizure phases of interdiction, the military's measure of effectiveness
(MOE) is based on the number of supporting missions provided. This MOE is not very
useful for a model which attempts to find optimal locations for interdiction assets.
Although it indicates the level of military support to reducing the flow of drugs into the
United States, it provides no quantitative measure of the effectiveness of the overall drug
interdiction program.
The quantity of drugs seized is a popular MOE, as it provides an evaluation
of how much drugs are prevented from entering the country. However, it is possible that,
when interdiction efforts are most successful, no drugs at all would be seized. That is,
shipments could be deterred, smugglers could be forced to use the most expensive
methods of shipping to avoid interdiction, etc.
The major goal of drug interdiction is to reduce the consumption of illegal
drugs. Military assets are an integral part of increasing the effectiveness of interdiction,
thereby helping to achieve this goal. In addition to seizing drugs and equipment,
interdiction increases the risks which smugglers face and causes them to change their
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methods of operation. All of these effects of interdiction result in higher costs to the
smugglers, costs which are eventually passed on to the consumers of illegal drugs.
Although some users are likely to be insensitive to increased drug prices, "the body of
economic support for a relationship between price and consumption is too strong to allow
much doubt that, at least in the long run, higher prices will lead to lower consumption."
[Ref. 3: p. 20] Therefore, if it can be measured or estimated with some confidence, cost
to the smugglers is an MOE which reflects the overall goal of the drug interdiction
program.
As computed by the SOAR model, total cost to the smugglers includes the
costs of unsuccessful shipments, thereby incorporating the MOE of the amount of drugs
seized. Parameters for an alternate objective function value could easily be extracted
from the simulation, or the optimization algorithm could be applied to any desired
objective function.
The simulation used as the objective function evaluator for the optimization
model presented in this thesis is a slightly modified version of the original SOAR model.
The changes involve the attempt to model smuggling routes with a geographical structure
and calculating the probability of interdiction based on the location of military assets.
2. Model Assumptions.
In any model, many simplifying assumptions are required. This is especially
true in attempting to model a process of this scale. Perhaps the biggest assumption lies
in the use of the SOAR model outcome as the objective function to be optimized. That
is, we assume that the simulation provides a reasonable estimate of the total cost to the
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smugglers. This includes accepting as reasonable the assumptions made in constructing
SOAR, which are described in the RAND publications.
Another major assumption involves modelling the drug smuggling routes.
Except for the natural chokepoints in the Caribbean, little is known about the exact routes
being used. Therefore, the routes presented in this model are assumed to be
representative of area routes of unknown width. In the Mona Passage, Yucatan Channel
and other chokepoints, the width of sea routes is constrained by the presence of land on
either side. However, in the Pacific, Southwest Border area, and for many air routes, the
width could be hundreds of miles. Assets which provide coverage of a route are assumed
to be patrolling the area which that route represents. Figure 3 displays a general idea of
smuggling routes as interpreted by the Drug Enforcement Agency.
« * New Yort City
Figure 3 Drug flows from South America into the United States.
Source: DEA Map 1 - 1987 (Revised 1989)
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A third assumption is made when computing the probability of detection on
the routes. Each asset represents a sensor which adds a probability of interdiction to the
route that it covers. It is also assumed that an asset covering a leg of the route acts
independently of other assets on that and other legs, and that detection on any leg of a
route can be taken as an event independent of all other legs on that route. Realistically,
a patrol aircraft on a route, which detects a suspicious surface contact is likely to be in
either direct or indirect contact with a surface asset on that leg or a subsequent leg, giving
information about the presence of that contact to the surface asset and increasing the
surface asset's probability of detecting and interdicting that contact. Similarly, a surface
asset may detect a suspicious aircraft and report it, etc. For modeling purposes, however,
we believe these assumptions to be reasonable. Independence between assets and routes
will result in SOAR providing an upper bound on the measure of effectiveness. This
consequence should be considered when estimating the probabilities of interdiction input
to the model for each asset type against each method of smuggling.
3. Data Structures and Computations.
a. Smuggling Routes.
The representation of routes is accomplished using a hierarchical
adjacency list of geographical points. The geographic points are listed in a data file
similar to that shown in Appendix A Section A.5., which includes points of origin for
drug shipments, intermediate route points, and points of entry into the United States.
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The information for the routes themselves is taken from another data file.
A description of the inputs and an example of the data file are in Appendix A Section
A.3.
b. Assets.
Appendix A Section A. 4. describes the input information and a data file
for interdiction assets. Although we have listed assets as SHIP1, PAIR1, etc., asset need
not necessarily refer to a single ship, aircraft or ground unit. An asset may be considered
whatever mix of elements is required to achieve the range and probability of interdiction
input to the model. For simplicity, we will continue to refer to assets as single units.
Asset types are used to describe assets with the same range and probability of interdiction.
By assigning additional asset types, the matrices containing this information could be
expanded to include unique input data for particular assets.
c. Computation of route probabilities.
A shipment of drugs will be interdicted on a particular route with a
probability computed in the subroutine PROBCOMP. In this subroutine, the legs of each
route are checked to determine if assets are located such that the leg falls within the range
of the assets. Up to this range, the asset contributes a constant probability of interdiction
to the route. Beyond this range, the probability decays exponentially as a function of the
additional distance. The probability of interdiction on a route is then computed as simply
the combination of independent probabilities for all assets covering all legs of the route.
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The probability decay function chosen results in probabilities for
individual assets decreasing to approximately 13.5% of the original value at twice the
asset range. For example, an asset with a given constant probability of 0.10 to 100 miles
will have a probability of interdiction equal to 0.0135 at 200 miles. This method of
computing probabilities can be supported by considering the given range of an asset as
that area which can be patrolled with a constant probability, and exponential decay of the
probability representing the decreasing effectiveness of the patrolling as the distance
between the asset and the route increases past that range.
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IV. THE ANNEALING MODEL
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The simulated annealing method is so-called for its resemblance to the annealing
of solids, in which a material is heated to the point where all particles arrange themselves
randomly in the liquid phase, and is slowly cooled so that all particles arrange themselves
in the low energy ground state of a corresponding lattice. [Ref. 22: p. 2]
The method starts at either a predetermined or random initial point. In the feasible
space of the independent variables, a random walk samples the objective function
[Ref. 23: p. 210] (analogous to the energy state of a physical system).
Each step providing an improved objective function value is automatically accepted.
Steps which are detrimental to the objective function value are accepted according to a
Boltzmann probability function, p = exp(-AE/KBT), which is dependent on the energy and
temperature of the physical system. This allows the path to walk out of local and global
optimal points [Ref. 23: p. 211]. The process is often called a Metropolis loop, named
for the author who used a model simulating the evolution of a solid to thermal
equilibrium in 1953 [Ref. 24: p. 14]. Obviously, the algorithm could run
indefinitely, walking in and out of the global optima. One way to prevent this from
happening is to specify the number of steps the algorithm is to take. However, this in no
way guarantees reaching the global optimum. Recently much research has been put into
developing cooling or annealing schedules. Essentially, such schedules decrease the
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probability of accepting a detrimental step by decreasing the temperature of the system
as the global optimum point is approached. The random walk is terminated when a
predetermined number of successive trials does not produce an acceptable objective
function value. [Ref. 23: p. 212]
B. APPLICATIONS
The simulated annealing method has been applied to optimization problems in
numerous fields, including physics, operations research, numerical analysis, biology,
materials science, game theory, code design, etc. [Ref. 22: p. 14].
There are many advantages and disadvantages associated with the simulated
annealing method. The algorithm is applicable to many different optimization problems
and is easy to implement. The greatest disadvantage is the potentially prohibitive amount
of time required to converge to a near-optimal solution. This is dependent on the cooling
schedule and the step size used in the random walk. [Ref. 25: p. 91]
C. THE GENERALIZED ANNEALING ALGORITHM
As stated previously, simulated annealing algorithms have been used almost
exclusively in applications which minimize the objective function. The probability
function is especially well-suited to cases where the objective function minimizes to zero,
or where the optimal value is known. In these cases the probability of accepting a non-
improving step is driven to zero as the optimum is approached.
In the case where the optimal value is not known, the typical algorithm calls for
selecting some initial estimate of the optimal value ((j)m ) and allow the random walk to
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sample the objective function value ((j)), continuing until
<J)
- (j) m becomes negative, then
decrease (j)m repeating this process as required. On the other hand, if the initial estimate
of
(J)m is too low, it is increased as part of the cooling schedule, so that (J) - <(> m will
approach zero. [Ref. 23: p. 213]
We have attempted one of many possible applications of this method to a
maximization problem, by taking an initial guess for the optimum as an input value, as
well as the number of steps to be taken before reducing the guess. Cooling the guess
(<|>m) is accomplished by keeping track of the highest value found so far ((j>B ), and
reducing
(J)m according to the function <J)m+1 = <|>m - a * (<J>m - <j>B), where a is a
predetermined fraction which controls the cooling speed. This ensures that <j>m is never
reduced past the best value found in the random walk. If the random walk produces a
value which is greater than either the current <j>m or the input guess, then both are
increased a significant amount above the higher value (we have chosen <j) m = 1.5 * <j) B ).
The cooling of (|)
ni again proceeds according to the previously described method.
In our application of the algorithm, we begin with a large step size (Ar) in order to
sample a significant portion of the feasible region. As §m is reduced (or cooled) we also
reduce the step size to a minimum value (Armin ) by a similar equation, sampling a tighter
area of the region. When a potential point of convergence is found, Ar is reduced to a
small value (Arlow ) in an attempt to find an acceptable move in the very close vicinity.
If an acceptable move is found, the step size is reset to the previous value (Arold ), and the
annealing continues.
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This algorithm is not guaranteed to locate the objective function value associated
with a global optimum. The value (3 in the probability function controls the rejection
ratio, and will also determine, in part, how close to the optimal value the algorithm
converges. For very low values of (3, the algorithm will converge at, or very close to, the
optimum, when the optimum value is known.
The feasible space and step generation used for our model are very simple,
consisting of upper and lower limits on the latitude and longitude for asset locations, and
random steps with size Ar. For example, we did not attempt to prevent assets from
moving onto land, restricted airspace, or within search range of other assets. These are
the more detailed geographic, operational, and political constraints, such as those
discussed in Chapter I, Section B, which could be used to control possible asset moves.
Such constraints could be represented in a subroutine that tests feasible locations and a
set of rules controlling the possible moves of assets relative to each other.
Our algorithm, shown in Figure 4, is very similar to that presented by Bohachevsky,
Johnson and Stein for a minimization problem allocating ballistic missile interceptors
[Ref. 26]. The following terms used in the algorithm are defined:
• (j) is the objective function value. A subscript of indicates the current value, 1
indicates the value at the new location. Other subscripts are as defined above.
• Q is the feasible space, that is, the set of latitudes and longitudes where assets may
be located.
• x is the set of latitudes and longitudes for all mobile assets. A subscript of
indicates the current location, 1 indicates the new location.
• Ar is the step size. Subscripts min and low indicate the minimum step size used
when cooling and the step size desired in attempt to find a more precise solution.
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<t>m = input guess.
Step 2: For each mobile asset, generate two independent standard normal random variates,
A, and A 2 , and compute the components of the random direction vector d:
d, = A/(A/*2 + A2 **2)**0.5, i = 1,2.
Step 3: Compute candidate locations for assets, set x, = Xq + Ar * d.
Step 4: If the candidate locations are infeasible, ie, x
€ Q, repeat Step 2.
Step 5: Compute the new objective function value, 4>,, and set A<j> = (J> 1 - <|> .
Step 6: If the step increases the objective function value (A(J) > 0), accept:
set k = 0, Xg = x,, <\> = <\> v and n = n + 1
.
If the step size has been reduced in Step 8 (k > S), reset step size Ar = Ar
old .
If
<t>1 > <t>B' Set ^B = 01-
6a: Increase § m and initial guess if new objective function value is greater, ie,
If <)>, > <})m , set<t> m = 1.5 *<!>,.
If <)), > initial guess, set guess = 1 .5 * <J>,.
Set n = 0.
6b: If N accepted steps taken (n > N), cool § m and the step size:




<J> B) and Ar = Ar - a * (Ar - Armin).
Set n = 0.
Go to Step 2.
Step 7: If the step is a decrease (A(J) < 0), compute probability of acceptance and
determine whether to accept or reject.
Set p = exp( p * A<(> /(<t> m -<J> ))- Generate a uniform random variate V.




Step 8: If the stopping rule has not been reached (k < S), go to Step 2,
otherwise, if k = S, attempt to find a more precise solution with small step size,
save current step size, Ar
old
= Ar, set Ar = Arlow , and go to Step 2.
Step 9: If the final stopping rule has not been reached (k < 2 * S), go to Step 2,
otherwise stop and return <)) as the optimal solution found.
Figure 4 Annealing algorithm to optimize interdiction asset locations relative to a
stochastic network.
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(3 is the control parameter for the probability function (analogous to Boltzmann's
constant).
a is the fraction for reducing tym and Ar
N is the number of accepted steps at each value for <j)m
S is the stopping rule, the control for the number of attempted moves rejected
before the solution is declared found.
k is used to count the number of consecutive rejected moves
n is used to count the number of accepted moves for each level of ()>m
The FORTRAN code for the model can be found in Appendix B.
D. RESULTS
The optimization model developed in this thesis was applied to a smuggling
network of eleven air and sea routes in the Caribbean region. Figure 5 displays this
network, formulated from the sample data sets in Appendix A. Some areas of the routes
used are intuitive, for example, those running through the Yucatan Channel and the Mona
and Windward Passages. However, these are meant to be illustrative of actual routes, and
are not based on intelligence or other official information. The model was run on a
number of different computers, SUN SPARC 1+ and 2 workstations, Tektronix 4336,
Silicon Graphics IRIX, and an AMDAHL 5990-500 mainframe computer. The four
UNIX systems yielded identical results, while the VMS-based mainframe computer found
similar results to the UNIX systems.
Two applications of the model were tested. The first examined the locations at
which the annealing algorithm converged. Ten runs each were performed with five
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Figure 5 Sample Caribbean smuggling network
mobile assets, three ships and two aircraft. The resulting locations from one run arc
plotted in Figure 6. It is clear that some of the locations could easily be improved. This
is due in part to the value of the probability function control parameter, p, used to ensure
convergence of the algorithm in a reasonable amount of time. Each of the ten runs found
different final locations, but all appeared reasonable and the optimal values found were
similar, with mean equal to 75153.2 (dollars x 1000) and a standard deviation of 7204.1.
The second application explored the response of the model to a changing number
of assets. Each run used equal numbers of ships and aircraft. Parameters of assets are















Three ships, two aircraft
Optimal value = 78047
Figure 6 Results of five asset run (one of ten)
(J)
= 615430.6 - 71.07 * (80 - ASSETS) ** 2.07, determined using non-linear regression,
fit the data well (R2 = 0.9922). This particular function is dependent on the number of
assets at the last data point, and is extremely simplistic, with total numbers of assets as
the independent variable. Runs with more than 80 assets will change the parameters of
this function, but will not significantly increase the maximum. Although the fit of the
curve is good, the variance at each level of assets cannot be assumed equal, mainly due
to the small sample size at the levels (2).
The regression model itself is not a fundamental result, but can be used to obtain
useful information. With 80 assets we are very nearly saturating the routes, obtaining
little additional benefit from adding assets. We will assume for the following discussion
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that 80 assets induce the highest possible total cost to the smugglers. In Figure 7 we have
plotted a curve depicting the fraction of maximum value achieved versus assets. This
fraction represents the regression function value divided by 615430.6, the function
evaluated at 80 assets. From this, we see that 50% of the maximum attainable effect on
the smugglers is obtained with 24 assets, 75% with 36 assets. In other words, 75% of the
maximum effectiveness is achieved with fewer than half the maximum number of assets.
It is highly unlikely that such quantities of assets would be available for employment at
any particular time. However, these results are entirely dependent on the specific
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ASSETS
Figure 7 Fraction of maximum value found (at 80 assets) vs assets
34
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we have demonstrated that simulated annealing can be employed to
find near-optimal locations for interdiction assets relative to a network with stochastic
flows that are determined by a simulation. Our approach also demonstrated an application
of this type of model to explore the relationship between the capabilities of interdiction
assets, their number, and the resulting effect on the overall effectiveness of the
interdiction effort. Although our model uses a simple representation of interdiction assets,
combinations of assets, and the geographic, operational and political constraints which
would normally be used to restrict feasible asset locations in the drug interdiction
problem, we believe that the results demonstrate this methodology's viability for
development into the type of analytic tool described in Chapter I, Section B.
The primary obstacle to further use of this methodology in counter-narcotics
operational analysis and planning is the questionable reliability and limited amount of
information available on smuggling activities. The credibility of results from this type
of model, including the validity of SOAR, is highly dependent on the accuracy of
information used in constructing the route network, and assigning costs to smugglers and
parameters to assets. The suspect reliability of smuggling data will make it difficult to
assess this credibility, short of actually employing operational assets and observing the
resulting effects on smuggling and drug use. Even this level of verification would not
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necessarily provide an accurate measure of credibility since the targets of drug interdiction
are the only true source of the information required, and they are not likely to come
forward with such details.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The next logical step in the development of an analytic tool useful to the counter-
narcotics program is to apply the methodology explored in this thesis, or the model
presented itself, to an expanded problem. Such an expansion should include all primary
cocaine smuggling regions (Atlantic/Caribbean, Pacific, and Southwest Border),
constraints reflecting the geographic and political considerations for asset locations, and
operational inputs, such as budget feasible asset combinations and capability restrictions
of assets. These constraints could easily be included in a subroutine which tests proposed
asset moves for feasibility. Analysis of the results from an expanded problem will
provide a more realistic evaluation of the utility that may be derived from this type of
tool.
Expanding the size of the problem produces a major drawback in the use of the
model developed in this thesis, extensive computer run times. With a network of only
eleven routes, the five asset runs described in our results averaged seven hours each on
the SUN SPARC 1+ workstation. Adding routes to the problem will significantly
increase the run time of SOAR. Furthermore, our testing used only one trial of SOAR
to obtain each new objective function value, while future testing should use the average
of multiple trials to reduce the variability of the simulation results. This will increase run
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times even more, by approximately a multiple of the number of trials. For these reasons,
analysis of the SOAR model to optimize performance, or translation into a more efficient
programming language, and the use of high speed computers would be beneficial to future
efforts.
A final consideration involves the variety of measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
being used by drug interdiction agencies, as discussed in Chapter in, Section B.l.
Development of a well-defined, quantifiable MOE for the entire drug interdiction program
would be very valuable to future analysis. The MOE produced by the SOAR model for
our optimization, total cost to the smugglers, relies heavily on information which may not
be particularly accurate, as would be the case for any MOE that reflects the goals of the
interdiction program as a whole. Continued intelligence efforts to gather accurate
information on illegal drug smuggling activities and improvements in the timeliness of
such data will help in defining an overall MOE and assessing the credibility of results
from analytic tools used in counter-narcotics planning, and will make the drug interdiction
program more effective.
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Step size for the annealing
algorithm in miles. Real.
Minimum step size for the
algorithm in miles. Real.
Step size in fine search
for optimum value in miles.
Real.






The stopping rule for the
algorithm. This number of
consecutive rejections stops
the algorithm. Integer.
Parameter used to decrement
the estimate of the optimal
value and step size.
Adjusted to control the speed
of cooling. Typically between
0.01 and 0.2. Real.
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GUESS Inital estimate of the
optimal objective function
value. Real.
BIGN The number of steps to be
taken at each level of
cooling. Integer.
b. Sample data set


























Number of methods for
smuggling drugs. Integer.
Number of phases. Integer.
Number of routes available.
Integer.
Number of times the analysis
period is to be simulated.
Reported results will be
averaged over the trials.
Integer.
Number of days to be











Number of days to run the
simulation before commeneing
the analysis. Integer.
Seed for random number
generator. Integer.
The cost at the source of a
kilogram of cocaine. Real.
Expected time between
shipments. Real.
Expected shipment size. Real.
The name of drug smuggling
method M. Character.
The cost to the smuggler of
an unsuccessful shipment
using method M. Does not
include the cost of the drug
or the cost associated with
the route. Real.
Maximum amount of drug that
may be shipped by method M.
Real.
b. Sample data set
METHODS PHASES ROUTES TRIALS RUNIN ENDTIME MEMORY SEED
3 2 3 2 120 60 0.1 7243
DRUGNAME DRUGCOST SHI PMEAN SHIPSIZE DAILY AMT
COCAINE 7500.0 0.71 250.0 350.0
METHOD RISK COMP RISK EXP SEIZE COST MAX SHIP
AIR 1200000.0 2.0 200000.0 2000 .0
SEA 1600000.0 2.0 40000.0 16000.0














The name of route R.
Character.
The cost to the smuggler for
using route R, incurred
whether or not the shipment
is successful. Real.
The index of the smuggling
method that is used on
route R. Integer.
(l=Air,2=Sea,3=Land).
The index of the geographic
area of route R. Integer.
( 1 =Atlantic,2=Pacific,
3=Southwest Border).
The index of the first point
of route R. Integer.
The index of the point
following P on route R.
Integer.
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b. Sample data set.
ROUTENR ROUTENAME ROUTECOST ROUTEMETHOD ROUTELOC
POINTS
1 MOIMA PASS 16000.00 2 1
1 10 11 38
2 WINDWARD 16000.00 2 1
2 12 13 14 37
3 YUCFLA1 16000.00 2 1
3 15 36















































Total number of assets,
mobile and fixed. Integer.
Total number of asset types.
Integer.
The name of asset A.
Character.
The latitude of asset A.
Real.
The longitude of asset A.
Real.




Index of the geographic-
location of asset A. Same as
ROUTELOC. Integer.
Range for asset type AT
versus smuggling method M for
which the probability of
interdiction is a constant.
Real.
Probability of interdiction
for asset type AT versus
smuggling method M on a
route, which is constant out
to range ASSETRANGE. Real.
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b. Sample data set.
TOTAL NUMBER OF ASSETS =
NUMBER OF ASSET TYPES = PATROL AIR, SHIPS, LAND UNITS, AEROSTATS
lSSET NAME ]LATITUDE LONGITUDE TYPE ]jOC
1 PAIR1 16.00 75.85 1 1
2 PAIR2 17.45 80.95 1 1
3 SHIP1 19.00 68.00 2 1
4 SHIP2 19.00 75.00 2 1
5 SHIP3 21 .98 86.18 2 1
6 CUDLOI KEY FL 24.41 81.30 4 1
7 MARFA TX 30.19 104.01 4 3
8 GREAT EXUMA 23 .33 75.47 4 1
ASSET RANGE 1JS METHOD
METHOD
ASSET AIR SEA LAND
AIR 100.0 10 0. 25.0
SHIPS 50.0 50 .0 0.0
LAND 10.0 0.0 5.0
BALLOONS 200.0 0.0 0.0
P( INTERDICT) ASSET VS METHOD
METHOD
ASSET AIR SEA LAND
AIR 0. 1 0.1 0.1
SHIPS 0.1 0.1 0.0
LAND 0.1 0.0 0.1








The name of geographic-
point P. Character.
The latitude of point P.
Real.
The longitude of point P.
Real.
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b. Sample data set.
POINT POINTNAME LATITUDE LONGITUDE
1 PT GALLINAS 12.15 71.45
2 RIO HACHA 11.30 7 3.00
3 SANTA MARTA 11 .15 74 .10
4 TURBO 8.00 76.45
5 BUENAVENTURA 3.58 77 .50
6 TUMACO 1.45 78.45
7 MEDELLIN 6.10 75.47
8 BOGOTA 4.32 74.15
9 CALI 3.20 76.33
10 SMONAPASS 17 .37 68.00
11 NMONAPASS 20 .50 68.00
12 SWINDWARD 17 .95 75.18
13 NWINDWARD 20.50 73 .82
14 STRAIGHTS 22.72 76.91
15 YUCATAN 21.98 86. 18
16 CENT MEXICO 25.00 103 .00
17 NOGOLES AZ 31 .20 110.55
18 BISBEE AZ 31.30 109.55
19 DOUGLAS AZ 31.20 109.30
20 YSLETA TX 31 .42 106.18
21 PRESIDIO TX 29.33 104.23
22 DELRIO TX 29.21 100.52
23 DOLORES TX 27 .42 99.47
24 BROWNSVILLE TX 25.95 97 .30
25 SAN DIEGO CA 32 .41 116.57
26 CALEXICO CA 32 .41 115.30
27 ??1 NM 31.40 108.50
28 ??2 NM 31.40 108.25
29 FREEPORT TX 28.56 95.21
3 GALVESTON TX 29.18 94 .48
31 HOUSTON TX 29.46 95.21
32 PORT LAVACA TX 28.36 96.38
33 SABINE TX 29.44 93 .54
34 MOBILE AL 30.42 88.03
35 PENSACOLA FL 30.25 87 .13
36 ST PETE FL 27.47 82 .38
37 FLAMINGO FL 2 5.10 80.55
38 DAYTONA BCH FL 29.11 81.02
39 MIAMI FL 25.45 80.11
4 LOS ANGELES CA 3 4.00 118.15
41 BAJA TIP 22 .64 109.82
42 S MEXICO 15.53 96.18
43 PACIFICl 13.32 105.36
44 PACIFIC2 30.00 118.00
45 PACIFIC3 20.40 107 .27
46 PACIFIC4 15.50 105.00
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B. OUTPUT DATA SETS
1. SOAR OUTPUT
Output of the model includes an echo of the input parameters, and the
following statistics:
1. Expected attempts per trial. The average number of shipments attempted during the
period being analyzed.
2. Expected successes per trial. The average number of successful shipments during the
analysis period.
3. Expected interdictions per trial. The average number of unsuccessful shipments
during the analysis period. Expected attempts = Expected successes + Expected
interdictions.
4. Success rate. The proportion of shipments that were successful.
5. Interdiction rate. The proportion of shipments that were unsuccessful.
6. Cost of incomplete shipments (in thousands). The average cost to the smuggler
because of unsuccessful shipments, including the cost of the method (such as an
airplane), the cost of the drug, and the cost of the route (such as gasoline).
7. Cost of completed shipments (in thousands). The average cost to the smuggler
because of successful shipments, including the cost of the drug and the cost of the
route.
8. Total cost to smugglers (in thousands). The sum of the cost of incomplete shipments
and the cost of completed shipments.
9. For each drug, the quantity that the smugglers attempted to ship.
10. For each drug, the quantity that the smugglers successfully shipped.
11. For each drug, the quantity that the smugglers lost because of unsuccessful shipments.
12. For each route, the expected attempts, successes, and failures are reported.
13. For each phase and each route, the expected attempts, successes and failures are
reported.
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14. For each drug and each route, the expected quantities shipped, captured, etc.[Ref. 2:
pp. 42,43]
2. ANNEALING MODEL OUTPUT
MAX TOTAL COST TO SMUGGLERS =
(IN THOUSANDS)
78047 .95
OPT VALUE FOUND IN 6630 STEPS
831 STEPS NOT ACCEPTED
419 5 INFEASIBLE MOVES FOUND
FINAL LOCATIONS
ASSET LATITUDE LONGITUDE
PAIR1 22 .715 84 .834
PAIR2 23 .539 77 .752
SHIP1 20 .728 83.596
SHIP2 20 .333 86.613
SHIP3 21 .687 68.579
CUDLOE KEY FL 24 .410 81.300
MARFA TX 3 .190 104.010
GREAT EXUMA 23 .330 75.470
FINAL PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION BY
ROUTE ROUTENAME PROBINTERDICT











CPU TIME = 17704.3 SECONDS
MAX VALUE FOUND = 7.83 917E+0 7
FINAL GUESS VALUE = 8.10845E+07




APPENDIX B. FORTRAN CODE
PROGRAM ANNEAL
WRITTEN BY LT JAMES J. HENRY IV, USN





& TLAT ( MAXASSETS ) , TLON ( MAXASSETS ) ,




INTEGER K,LITTLEN, I , ROUTENR, MOVES, NOTMOVE, INFEAS
LOGICAL FEASIBLE, ACCEPT, FINISH, GOODINPUT




IF (.NOT. GOODINPUT) STOP
OBJVALM = GUESS
DO 50 1=1, NUMASSETS
TLAT ( I ) = LATASSET ( I
)
TLON ( I ) = LONASSET ( I
50 CONTINUE
RUN THE SIMULATION WITH INITIAL DATA POINTS
CALL SMUGSIM (TLAT, TLON, TOTCOST)
OBJVAL0 = TOTCOST
OBJVALB = OBJVAL0










FIND NEW LOCATION FOR ALL ASSETS EXCEPT
BALLOONS (TYPE 4)
DO 140 I = 1,NUMASSETS
IF(ASSETTYPEU) . NE . 4) THEN
120 CONTINUE
CALL LNORPCdSEEDl, A, 2)
DENOM = SQRT(A{1)**2 + A(2)**2)
TLAT(I) = LATASSET(I) + DELR*A ( 1 ) /DENOM
TLON(I) = LONASSET(I) + DELR*A ( 2 ) /DENOM
CHECK FOR FEASIBILITY
IF(ASSETLOCd) . EQ . 1) THEN
CALL LANTCHECK (TLAT ( I ) , TLON ( I ) , FEASIBLE]
ELSEIF(ASSETLOC(I) . EQ . 2) THEN




, TLON ( I ) , FEASIBLE)
ENDIF
IF d NOT. FEASIBLE) INFEAS = INFEAS + 1




RUN THE SIMULATION WITH NEW DATA POINTS
CALL SMUGS IM (TLAT, TLON, TOTCOST)
OBJVAL1 = TOTCOST
DELOBJ = OBJVAL1 - OBJVAL0
ADJUST MAX VALUE GUESS IF REQUIRED
IF(OBJVALl .GT. OBJVALB) OBJVALB = OBJVAL1
IF(OBJVALB .GT. GUESS) GUESS = 1.5 * OBJVALB
IF (OBJVALB .GT. OBJVALM) OBJVALM = GUESS
TO ACCEPT THE MOVE
160
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
IF (DELOBJ .GE. 0.0) THEN
ACCEPT = .TRUE.
ELSE
CK = OBJVALM - OBJVAL0
IF(CK .EQ. 0.0) CK = 0.000001
P = EXP (BETA * DELOBJ / CK)
CALL LRNDPCdSEEDl, V, 1 )




K = K + 1





DO 160 I = 1,NUMASSETS




MOVES = MOVES + 1
OBJVAL0 = OBJVAL1






ELSEIF(K .GE. (2 * S) ) THEN
FINISH = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(K .GT. S .AND. ACCEPT) THEN
DELR = DELROLD
ENDIF
IF(LITTLEN .GE. BIGN) THEN
OBJVALM = OBJVALM - ALPHA * (OBJVALM - OBJVALB)
DELR = DELR - ALPHA * {DELR - DELRMIN)
ENDIF
IF (OBJVALM .LT. OBJVALB) OBJVALM = OBJVALB





WRITE(75, 520) OBJVAL0/ 1000 .
52 FORMAT (IX, 'MAX TOTAL COST TO SMUGGLERS = ',F10.2)
WRITE(75, 530)
53 FORMAT (1 OX, ' (IN THOUSANDS)')
WRITE (75, 50 0) MOVES
500 FORMAT (IX, 'OPT VALUE FOUND IN ',110,' STEPS')
WRITE ( 7 5 , 50 1 ) NOTMOVE
501 FORMATQ9X, 110, ' STEPS NOT ACCEPTED')
WRITE(75, *)
WRITE (75, 510) INFEAS





534 FORMAT (1 IX, 'FINAL LOCATIONS')
WRITE(75, 535)
53 5 FORMAT ( 1 IX, 'ASSET' , ' LATITUDE ',' LONGITUDE ')
DO 550 I=1,NUMASSETS
WRITE (75, 54 0) ASSETNAME ( I ) , LATASSET ( I ) , LONASSET (
I




589 FORMAT( 'FINAL PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION BY ROUTE'
WRITE (75, 59 0)
59 FORMAT ( 'ROUTE' , 5X, ' ROUTENAME
'
, 4X, ' PROBINTERDICT ' )
DO 60 ROUTENR = 1, NUMROUTES
WRITE (75, 610) ROUTENR, ROUTENAME (ROUTENR)
,
& PROBINTERDICT (ROUTENR, 1)







WRITE (75, * )






CPU TIME = ', CPUTIME,' SECONDS
MAX VALUE FOUND = ' , MAXNOW





******* *******************SUBROUTINES TO CHECK FEASIBLE REGIONS
SUBROUTINE LANTCHECK ( LAT , LON, FEASIBLE)
*




IF (LON .LE. 87.0 .AND. LON .GE.67.0 .AND.




SUBROUTINE PACCHECK (LAT, LON, FEASIBLE;
REAL LAT , LON
LOGICAL FEASIBLE
FEASIBLE FALSE

























. 120.0 .AND. LON .GE. 118.691) THEN
33.773) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
. 118.0) THEN
32.50) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
. 115.50) THEN
-132.70 - 1.40*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
113.00) THEN
-64.40 + .80*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
107.00) THEN
-69.1667 + . 8333*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE
84.50) THEN
-39.4444 + .5556*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE
7 9.00) THEN
-15.5455 + .2727*LON) .AND.





SUBROUTINE SWBCHECK (LAT, LON, FEASIBLE)





TF(LON .LE. 117.13 .AND. LON .GE. 115.0} THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (33.74 - ,0094*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 111.0) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-7.015 + .345*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIFtLON .GE. 108.295) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (33.7421 - .0222*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 106.37) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. 31.742) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 105.0) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-51.18 + .7796*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 104.474) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-173.537 + 1.9449*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 103.474) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-38.3616 + .6510*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIFtLON .GE. 103.36) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. 29.0) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIFtLON .GE. 102.731) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (166.5411 - 1.3307*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON .GE. 101.462) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. 29.837) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON . GE . 100.747) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-72.6813 + 1.0098*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON . GE . 99.64) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-104.1222 + 1.3225*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIF(LON . GE . 99.00) THEN
IF(LAT .GE. (-168.6709 + 1.9703*LON)) FEASIBLE = .TRUE.
ELSEIFtLON .GE. 97.133) THEN




******* SMUGSIM SUBROUTINE ************************************
SUBROUT INE SMUGS IM ( TLAT , TLON , TOTCOST
)
C SMUGGLERS' SIMULATION - 2/3/87
* ADAPTED FROM RAND CORPORATION SIMULATION OF ADAPTIVE
* RESPONSE: A MODEL OF DRUG INTERDICTION . [Ref. 2]
C INSTALLATION REMARKS:
C
C YOU'LL ALSO NEED TO SELECT "SIZING PARAMETERS" LARGE ENOUGH
C TO HANDLE YOUR ANALYSIS, BUT NOT SO LARGE AS TO MAKE THE
C PROGRAM TOO LARGE TO RUN ON YOUR MACHINE. SEE THE BEGINNING








C INITIALIZE THE DATA COLLECTION ARRAYS.
DO 30, R=l,MAXROUTES
52
AMOUNTATTEMPTED (R) = 0.
AMOUNTSUCCEEDED(R) = 0.
ATTEMPTS (R) = 0.
SUCCESSES (R) = 0.
DO 20, THISPHASE = 1,MAXPHASES
ATTEMPTSBYPHASE(R,THISPHASE) = 0.





C SET UP THE TABLE OF WEIGHTS FOR PAST SHIPMENTS.
KMEMORY = ALOG(MEMORYVALUE) / (-LONGPAST)
DO 40, T=0,LONGPAST
EXPTABLE(T) = EXP ( -KMEMORY*REAL (T )
)
4 CONTINUE
* CALL THE SUBROUTINE TO COMPUTE ROUTE PROBABILITIES BASED ON
* ASSET LOCATIONS
CALL PROBCOMP(TLAT,TLON)
C CALL THE SUBROUTINE THAT DOES THE RUN IN.
CALL PEACE




* COMPUTE OUTPUT TO ANNEALING ALGORITHM










C COMPUTE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS, SUCCESSES, COSTS, ETC
DO 30, R=l,NUMROUTES
TOTATTEMPTS = TOTATTEMPTS + ATTEMPTS (R)
TOTSUCCESSES = TOTSUCCESSES + SUCCESSES (R)
TOTATTEMPTED = TOTATTEMPTED +
& AMOUNTATTEMPTED(R)
TOTSHIPPED = TOTSHIPPED + AMOUNTSUCCEEDED ( R
)
SUCCESSCOSTS = SUCCESSCOSTS +
& AMOUNTSUCCEEDED (R) * DRUGCOST
FAILURECOSTS = FAILURECOSTS +
& ( AMOUNTATTEMPTED { R )
-

















SUBROUTINE COMPFACT ( RNUMERATOR, RDENOMINATOR, R)
C GET THE NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR OF THE "R" FACTOR, WHICH
C WILL BE USED TO INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION










RDENOMINATOR = RDENOMINATOR + PASTSHIPMENTS ( R , S
)
10 CONTINUE
DO 20, S=0, RECENT PAST












INTEGER*4 DAY1 , DAY2 , DAYN, M, N, TEMP, TEMP2
,
& P, ROUTENR, I, J, PTS(MAXPTS)
,
& METHOD,
& POINT, TYPE, ASSET




C GOODINPUT WILL INDICATE WHETHER THE DATA WAS CLEAN AND THE
C SIMULATION SHOULD BE RUN.
GOODINPUT = .TRUE.
54





READ (55, 4010) STEPS I ZEM
READ(55, 4010)STEPSIZEMIN
READ(55, 4010)STEPSIZELOW
4010 FORMAT (2 OX, F5 . 1
)
* APPROXIMATION OF STEP SIZE IN DEGREES
DELR = STEPSIZEM/60.0
DELRMIN = STEPSIZEMIN/60.0
DELRLOW = STEPSIZELOW/60 .0
*
READ (55, 4 02 0) BETA










4050 FORMAT (20X,F15. 2)
*
READ (55, 4060) BIGN
4 060 FORMAT (2 OX, 110)
*
CLOSE (55)
: READ IN THE OVERALL SOAR SIMULATION DATA.
OPEN (76, FILE=' INPUT.DAT'
)
READ(76, *)
READ (76,5010) NUMMETHODS, NUMPHASES, NUMROUTES,
& NUMTRIALS,RUNIN,ENDTIME,MEMORYVALUE, IX
5010 FORMAT ( 6 ( 15 , 4X ) , F10 . 5 , 2X, 15
)
: CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY METHODS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (NUMMETHODS .GT. MAXMETHODS)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
: CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY PHASES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (NUMPHASES . GT . MAXPHASES)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
: CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY ROUTES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (NUMROUTES . GT . MAXROUTES
)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
: CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY DAYS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (ENDTIME .GT. MAXDAYS)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
: MAKE SURE THE INITIAL SEED IS ODD. (IN CASE WE RUN ON A SUN
IX = IX / 2
IX = IX * 2 + 1
: READ IN THE DRUG RELATED DATA RECORDS.
READ (76, *)
55
READ (76,5020) DRUGNAME, DRUGCOST, EXSHIPMENTINTRVL,
& EXSHIPMENTSIZE,DAILYAMOUNT
5020 FORMAT (A10,4F10.5)
C READ IN THE METHOD RELATED RECORDS.
TEMP = NUMMETHODS
IF (TEMP .GT. MAXMETHODS) TEMP = MAXMETHODS
READ (76, *)
DO 40, M=1,TEMP
READ (76,5030) METHODNAME (M)
,





IF (NUMMETHODS .GT. TEMP) THEN




C READ IN THE DAYS WHEN EACH PHASE ENDS. SET UP THE VECTOR
C INDICATING WHICH PHASE IS IN EFFECT FOR EACH DAY.
DAY1 =
TEMP = NUMPHASES
IF (TEMP .GT. MAXPHASES) TEMP = MAXPHASES
DO 70, N=1,TEMP
READ (7 6,5040) DAY2
5040 FORMAT (15)
TEMP2 = DAY2
IF (TEMP2 .GT. MAXDAYS) TEMP2 = MAXDAYS
IF (TEMP2 .GE. DAY1) THEN
WRITE (77,6016) N,TEMP2








* READ IN THE NETWORK ROUTES AND ROUTE DATA




DO 2 50 ROUTENR = 1 , NUMROUTES
DO 210 P = 1, MAXPOINTS
NEXT (ROUTENR, P) =
210 CONTINUE
READ (96,5075) ROUTENAME ( ROUTENR ) , ROUTECOST ( ROUTENR ) ,
& ROUTEMETHOD ( ROUTENR ) , ROUTELOC ( ROUTENR
)




READ(96, 5080) FIRST (ROUTENR)
,





IF(P .NE. 0) THEN
NEXT { ROUT ENR, P) =
P = NEXT(ROUTENR, P
J = J + 1








* READ IN THE ASSET DATA
OPEN (98, FILE=' ASSET.DAT'
)
READ (98, 53 00)NUMASSETS
READ (98, 5300)NUMASSETTYPES
53 FORMAT ( 2 5X, 15)
C CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY ASSETS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (NUMASSETS . GT . MAXASSETS)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
C CHECK WHETHER TOO MANY ASSET TYPES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
TEMPIF = (NUMASSETTYPES .GT. MAXASSETTYPES
)
CALL WRTERROR (TEMPIF, GOODINPUT)
READ (98, *)
DO 3 50 ASSET = 1, NUMASSETS
READ(98, 532 0) ASSETNAME( ASSET)
,
t LATASSET ( ASSET ) , LONASSET ( ASSET ) ,
& ASSETTYPE( ASSET) , ASSETLOC (ASSET)







DO 360 TYPE=1, NUMASSETTYPES
READ (98, 532 5) ( RANGE (TYPE, METHOD) , METHOD=l , NUMMETHODS
)








READ (98, 533 0) ( I PD (TYPE, METHOD) ,METHOD=l , 3
)
5330 FORMAT(15X,3 (F5.3, 5X)
390 CONTINUE
CLOSE (98)
* READ IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL DATA
OPEN (95, FILE=' GEOGR.DAT'
READ (95, *)
392 READ (95, 54 00 , END=3 95 ) POINT, POINTNAME ( POINT) , LAT (POINT) , LON ( POINT)



















C SET THE SHIPMENT COUNTER TO ZERO.
NUMSHIPMENT =
C DETERMINE WHEN THE NEXT SHIPMENT WILL OCCUR.
CALL LRNDPC (IX, RANDNM, 1)
NEXTEVENT = ENDTIME +1.0
NEXTSHIPMENT = - EXSHIPMENTINTRVL * ALOG ( RANDNM)
IF (NEXTSHIPMENT . LT . NEXTEVENT) THEN
NEXTEVENT = NEXTSHIPMENT
ENDIF
C GET THE PAST FROM THE LONG RUN IN.
DO 30, D=0,LONGPAST
DO 20, R=l,NUMROUTES
PASTSHIPMENTS(R,D) = PEACESHIPMENTS (R, D)








C DO THE INITIAL RUN IN.
C PROGRAM VARIABLES:
INCLUDE ' COMMON . FOR
'
REAL AMOUNT, PROBCAUGHT, RFACTOR, TEMPTIME, RANDNM, ACTUALRISKCOMP
INTEGER*4 D,R, RDENOMINATOR, RNUMERATOR, T, TRIPS
LOGICAL TRIPSUCCESS
p***********************************************************************
C DETERMINE THE TIME OF THE FIRST SHIPMENT.
NEXTEVENT = RUNIN +1.0
CALL LRNDPC ( IX, RANDNM, 1)
NEXTSHIPMENT = -EXSHIPMENTINTRVL * ALOG (RANDNM)




C INITIALIZE THE ARRAYS DESCRIBING THE PAST.
DO 23 0, D=0, LONG PAST





C FOR EACH DAY OF RUNIN. .
.
DO 100, DAYNOW=l, RUNIN
THISPHASE = 1
C SHIFT THE ARRAYS DESCRIBING THE PAST.
DO 20, R=l,NUMROUTES
DO 10, D=LONGPAST, 1, -1
PASTSHIPMENTS(R,D) = PASTSHIPMENTS { R, D-l
)
PASTFAILURES(R,D) = PASTFAILURES { R, D-l
)
10 CONTINUE
PASTSHIPMENTS (R, 0) =
PASTFAILURES (R, 0) =
2 CONTINUE
C LOOP THROUGH THE DAYS SHIPMENTS.
3 IF (NEXTEVENT .GE. DAYNOW + 1.0) GO TO 100
C GET THE AMOUNT OF THE NEXT SHIPMENT.
AMOUNT = EXSHIPMENTSIZE
C SELECT THE ROUTE TO BE USED.
CALL SELROUTE ( R , TR I PS , AMOUNT , ACTUALR I SKCOMP
)
C COMPUTE THE NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR OF THE
C "R" FACTOR.
CALL COMPFACT ( RNUMERATOR , RDENOMINATOR , R
)
C FOR EACH TRIP REQUIRED TO GET AMOUNT SHIPPED. .
.
DO 70, T=l, TRIPS
C COMPUTE THE "R" FACTOR.
RFACTOR =1.0
IF (RDENOMINATOR .GT. 0.0) THEN
RFACTOR = RNUMERATOR/ RDENOMINATOR
TEMPT IME = NEXTEVENT
IF (TEMPTIME .GT. RECENTPAST) THEN
IF (TEMPTIME .GT. LONGPAST
)
& TEMPTIME = LONGPAST
RFACTOR = RFACTOR * TEMPTIME/RECENTPAST
ENDIF
ENDIF
IF (RFACTOR . LT . 1.0) RFACTOR =1.0
C COMPUTE THE PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION.
IF (PROBINTERDICT(R, THISPHASE) .GE. .9999) THEN
PROBCAUGHT =1.0
ELSE
PROBCAUGHT = 1.0 - EXP (RFACTOR *ALOG ( 1 . -
& PROBINTERDICT (R, THISPHASE) )
ENDIF
C DETERMINE WHETHER THE TRIP WAS SUCCESSFUL.
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CALL LRNDPC( IX, RANDNM, 1)
TRIPSUCCESS = (RANDNM .GE. PROBCAUGHT
)
C DO THE BOOKKEEPING. (NOT VERY EXTENSIVE
C DURING THE RUN IN.
)
PASTSHIPMENTS(R, 0) = PASTSHIPMENTS ( R, ) + 1
IF (.NOT. TRIPSUCCESS)
& PASTFAILURES (R, 0) = PASTFAILURES ( R, ) + 1
RNUMERATOR = RNUMERATOR + 1
RDENOMINATOR = RDENOMINATOR + 1
7 CONTINUE
C GET THE TIME AND TYPE OF THE NEXT SHIPMENT.
CALL LRNDPC( IX, RANDNM, 1)
NEXTSHIPMENT = NEXTEVENT -
& EXSHIPMENTINTRVL * ALOG ( RANDNM)
NEXTEVENT = RUNIN +1.0





C SAVE THE LAST LONGPAST DAYS FOR USE INITIALIZING EACH TRIAL.
DO 13 0, D=0, LONGPAST
DO 12 0, R=l,NUMROUTES
PEACESH I PMENTS ( R , D ) = PASTSH I PMENTS ( R , D
)





SUBROUTINE SELROUTE (RCHOSEN, TRI PS , AMOUNT, ACTUALRISKCOMP)
C SELECT THE ROUTE FOR THE NEXT SHIPMENT.
C PROGRAM VARIABLES:
INCLUDE 'COMMON. FOR'
REAL AMOUNT , CUMPROB , ROUTEPROB , COSTROUTE ( MAXROUTES }
,
& ACTUALRISKCOMP, PROBCAUGHT (MAXROUTES)
,
& TEMPNUMERATOR (MAXROUTES ) , TEMPDENOMINATOR (MAXROUTES )
,
& TOTCOST, WEIGHT, TEMPRISKCOMP (MAXROUTES)
INTEGER*4 RCHOSEN, TRIPS, RMETHOD, R,
S
p***********************************************************************











TEMPDENOMINATOR ( R ) =
& TEMPDENOMINATOR (R) + WEIGHT*PASTSHIPMENTS ( R, S
)




C FOR EACH ROUTE, COMPUTE THE PERCEIVED PROBABILITY OF BEING
C CAPTURED AND HENCE THE EXPECTED COST OF USING THE ROUTE.
C THE PROBABILITY A ROUTE WILL BE CHOSE WILL BE PROPORTIONAL
C TO THE INVERSE EXPECTED COST OF USING THE ROUTE, SO GET THE




TRIPS = INT (AMOUNT /CAPACITY (RMETHOD) + 0.999)
IF (TEMPDENOMINATOR (R) . GT . 0.001) THEN






. LE . 0.0001) THEN
TEMPRISKCOMP ( R ) =RISKCOMP ( RMETHOD)
ELSE
TEMPRISKCOMP (R) =RISKCOMP (RMETHOD) *
& ( (2*PROBCAUGHT(R) ) **RISKCOMPEXP ( RMETHOD)
)
ENDIF
COSTROUTE(R) = 1 . / (TRIPS* ( PROBCAUGHT (R ) *CAPCOST ( RMETHOD)
+
& ROUTECOST(R) + TEMPRISKCOMP ( R ))
+
& PROBCAUGHT ( R) *AMOUNT*DRUGCOST)
TOTCOST = TOTCOST + COSTROUTE(R)
4 CONTINUE
C NOW CHOOSE THE ROUTE, WHERE THE PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING A






R = R + 1
CUMPROB = CUMPROB + COSTROUTE { R) /TOTCOST
IF (CUMPROB .LT. ROUTEPROB) GO TO 50
RCHOSEN = R
RMETHOD = ROUTEMETHOD( RCHOSEN)







C THIS SUBROUTINE PERFORMS THE SIMULATION FOR A SINGLE SAMPLE
C POINT.
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p* *************** * ****************** * ********************************** *
C PROGRAM VARIABLES:
I NCLUDE ' COMMON . FOR
'
REAL AMOUNT, PROBCAUGHT, RFACTOR, TEMPTIME, RANDNM, ACTUALRISKCOMP,
£< TIMESHIPPED(MAXSHIPMENTS)




C INITIALIZE FOR THIS TRIAL.
CALL INITSIM
C FOR EACH DAY . .
.
DO 100, DAYNOW=0, ENDTIME
C GET THE POINTER INTO THE ARRAY OF INTERDICTION PROBABILITIES.
THISPHASE = CURRENTPHASE(DAYNOW)
C SHIFT THE PAST HISTORY ARRAYS.
DO 20, R=l,NUMROUTES
DO 10, D=LONGPAST, 1, -1
PASTSHIPMENTS(R,D) = PASTSHI PMENTS (R, D- 1
)




PASTFAILURES (R, 0) =
2 CONTINUE
C LOOP THROUGH THE EVENTS THAT HAPPEN TODAY
.
30 IF (NEXTEVENT .GE. DAYNOW + 1.0) GO TO 100




C SELECT THE ROUTE.
CALL SELROUTE ( R , TR I PS , AMOUNT , ACTUALR I SKCOMP
)
C GET THE NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR OF THE "R" FACTOR.
CALL COMPFACT ( RNUMERATOR , RDENOMINATOR , R
)
C MULTIPLE TRIPS MAY BE REQUIRED TO SHIP THE GIVEN
C AMOUNT OF DRUG ON THE SELECTED ROUTE, DUE TO
C CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS. THE VARIABLE TRIPS CONTAINS
C THE NUMBER OF TRIPS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED. I EXPECT
C THAT THIS VARIABLE WILL USUALLY BE CONTAIN A ONE
C AND THAT AS A RESULT DO-LOOP 7 WILL USUALLY BE
C EXECUTED ONLY ONCE.
DO 70, T=l, TRIPS
C COMPUTE THE "R" FACTOR.
RFACTOR =1.0
IF (RDENOMINATOR .GT. 0.0) THEN
RFACTOR = RNUMERATOR /RDENOMINATOR
TEMPTIME = NEXTEVENT
IF (TEMPTIME .GT. RECENTPAST) THEN
IF (TEMPTIME . GT . LONGPAST)
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& TEMPTIME = LONGPAST
RFACTOR = RFACTOR * TEMPTIME/ RECENTPAST
ENDIF
ENDIF
IF (RFACTOR . LT . 1.0) RFACTOR =1.0
C COMPUTE THE PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION.
C COMPUTE THE PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION.
IF (PROBINTERDICT{R,THISPHASE) .GE. .9999) THEN
PROBCAUGHT =1.0
ELSE




C DETERMINE WHETHER THE TRIP WAS SUCCESSFUL.
CALL LRNDPC(IX,RANDNM, 1)
TRIPSUCCESS = (RANDNM . GE . PROBCAUGHT)
C DO THE REQUIRED BOOKKEEPING.
NUMSHIPMENT = NUMSHIPMENT + 1
SUCCESS (NUMSH I PMENT) = TRIPSUCCESS
TIMESHIPPED (NUMSHIPMENT) = NEXTEVENT
ROUTEUSED( NUMSHIPMENT) = R
ATTEMPTS (R) = ATTEMPTS (R) +1.0
AMOUNTATTEMPTED ( R ) =






SUCCESSES (R) = SUCCESSES (R) +1.0
AMOUNTSUCCEEDED(R) =
V AMOUNTSUCCEEDED(R) + AMOUNT/TRIPS
SUCCESSESBYPHASE(R,THISPHASE) =
& SUCCESSESBYPHASE(R,THISPHASE) + 1
ELSE
PASTFAILURES (R, 0) = PASTFAILURES ( R, ) + 1
FAILURECOSTS=FAILURECOSTS+ACTUALRISKCOMP+
& ROUTECOST(R) +
& CAPCOST ( ROUTEMETHOD ( R )
)
ENDIF
PASTSHIPMENTS(R, 0) = PASTSHIPMENTS (R, ) + 1
RNUMERATOR = RNUMERATOR + 1
RDENOMINATOR = RDENOMINATOR + 1
7 CONTINUE
C DETERMINE WHEN THE NEXT SHIPMENT OF THIS DRUG WILL BE
CALL LRNDPC ( IX , RANDNM , 1
)
NEXTSHIPMENT = NEXTEVENT -
& EXSHIPMENTINTRVL * ALOG ( RANDNM)
C DETERMINE WHAT THE NEXT SHIPMENT WILL BE.
NEXTEVENT = ENDTIME +1.0










SUBROUTINE WRTERROR (ERRORCONDITION, GOODINPUT)
















SUBROUTINE PROBCOMP (TLAT, TLON)
* THIS SUBROUTINE COMPUTES PROBABILITIES OF INTERDICTION ON
* ROUTES AS A FUNCTION OF ASSET DISTANCE FROM ROUTE.
* PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION IS INPUT TO SMUGSIM.
*
. INCLUDE 'COMMON. FOR'
*
REAL Ml , M2 , Bl , B2 , TEMPPI , LATINT, LONINT, DST, DEND, LENGTH, DIST, A,
& TLAT(MAXASSETS) , TLON (MAXASSETS) ,GSDIS,FCTR
INTEGER P,Q,R
* COMPUTE PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION FOR EACH ROUTE
DO 405 R=l,NUMROUTES









IF(LON(P) .NE. LON(Q) .AND.
& LAT(P) .NE. LAT(Q))THEN
M1=(LAT(P) - LAT(Q) )
/








IF(LON(P) .NE. LON(Q) .AND.
LAT(P) .NE. LAT(Q))THEN
B2=LATASSET (ASSET) - M2*LONASSET
LATINT=(B1*M2 - B2*M1 ) / (M2-M1
)
LONINT=(Bl-B2) / (M2-M1)





















IF(DST .LE. LENGTH .AND. DEND
DIST=GSDIS (LONASSET (ASSET)
LONINT,LATINT)
ELSEIF(DST . LT . DEND) THEN
DIST=GSDIS (LONASSET (ASSET) , LATASSET (ASSET
LON ( P ) , LAT ( P )
)
ELSE
DIST=GSDIS ( LONASSET (ASSET







COMPUTE PROBABILITIES (INDEPENDENCE ASSUMEDO
IF(DIST .LE.
& RANGE(ASSETTYPE(ASSET) , ROUTEMETHOD ( R ) ) ) THEN
A = 1.0 - I PD(ASSETTYPE( ASSET ), ROUTEMETHOD (R) )
ELSE
IF (RANGE (ASSETTYPE (ASSET) , ROUTEMETHOD (R) ) .Eg. 0.0)
& RANGE (ASSETTYPE (ASSET) , ROUTEMETHOD (R) ) = 0.0001
FCTR=( RANGE (ASSETTYPE (ASSET) , ROUTEMETHOD (R) ) -DIST)
/
L RANGE (ASSETTYPE (ASSET) , ROUTEMETHOD ( R )
)













Q = NEXT(R, P)




= 1.0 -(1.0 - TEMPPI)
*





REAL FUNCTION GSDIS ( XI, Yl, X2 , Y2
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* FUNCTION COMPUTES THE GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE IN MILES
* BETWEEN TWO POINTS EXPRESSED IN LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE
REALM XI,Y1,X2,Y2
REALM RARC,RLAT1,RLAT2, RLON1 , RLON2 , RPD
* LOCAL DATA INITIALIZATION
DATA RPD /0.1745329433017307E-01/
* GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE
*
* INPUTS ARE TWO POINTS EXPRESSED AS (W. LONGITUDE, N. LATITUDE)
* CONVERT DEGREES TO RADIANS
RLON1 = RPD * XI
RLAT1 = RPD * Yl
RLON2 = RPD * X2
RLAT2 = RPD * Y2
* SPHERICAL ARC LENGTH IN RADIANS
ARGUMENT = (SIN ( RLAT1 ) *SIN ( RLAT2
)
& +COS(RLATl) *COS(RLAT2) *COS ( RLON1 -RLON2 )
)
IF (ARGUMENT . GT . 1.0) ARGUMENT =1.0
IF ( ARGUMENT . LT . -1.0) ARGUMENT = -1.0
RARC = ACOSf ARGUMENT)
* ARC LENGTH IN STATUTE MILES WITH ROUGH CORRECTION FOR OBLATENESS
* OBLATENESS CONTRIBUTES LESS THAN 0.2 5% CORRECTION.
* IN U.S., DARC IS APPROXIMATELY 3959.U*RARC
*
GSDIS = 3959 . 0E0*RARC
RETURN
END
******* RANDOM NUMBER GENERATING SUBROUTINES *********************
C ADAPTED FROM LEWIS, ORAV, AND URIBE ENHANCED SIMULATION AND
C STATISTICS PACKAGE [Ref. 27]
C THIS PROGRAM WILL GENERATE A VECTOR OF NORMAL RANDOM VARIABLES
C ACCORDING TO THE SINE-COSINE METHOD
C
SUBROUTINE LNORPC ( ISEED, A, N)
INTEGER N, I, IND, ISEED







IF (IND.GE.0) GOTO 2

























DO 5 I = 1 , N
DSEED = DMOD(950706376.D0*DSEED,D31Ml)
DSEED = DMOD ( 16807 . D0*DSEED, D3 1M1
)
U(I) = DSEED / D31
CONTINUE
ISEED = INT (DSEED)
RETURN
END








MAXMETHODS, MAXPHASES, MAXROUTES, MAXSHIPMENTS,
MAXASSETS , MAXASSETTYPES , MAXPOINTS
,
MAXPTS
PARAMETER ;LONGPAST=120, RECENTPAST=2 0,
MAXDAYS=73 0,
MAXMETHODS=3, MAXPHASES=12 , MAXROUTES=100
,
MAXSHIPMENTS=60 00,MAXASSETS=100 /





















FAILURECOSTS , KMEMORY , MEMORYVALUE
,











& SUCCESSESBY PHASE (MAXROUTES, MAXPHASES)
,
& LAT( MAX POINTS) , LON (MAX POINTS )
,
& LATASSET { MAXASSETS ) , LONASSET ( MAXASSETS )
,
& DELR,DELRMIN,DELRLOW,
& BETA, ALPHA, RANGE (MAXASSETTYPES , MAXMETHODS )
,
I I PD ( MAXASSETT Y PES , MAXMETHODS ) , GUESS
INTEGER VARIABLES:
INTEGERM CURRENT PHASE ( rMAXDAYS ) , DAYNOW, ENDTIME, NTRIAL,
& NEXTEVENTTY PE , NUMMETHODS , NUMPHASES
,
& NUMROUTES , NUMSH I PMENT , NUMTR I ALS
,
& PASTSHIPMENTS(MAXROUTES, 0: LONG PAST)
,
& PASTEAI LURES (MAXROUTES, 0:LONGPAST)
& ROUTEMETHOD ( MAXROUTES ) ,RUNIN,
& THISPHASE,
& PEACESH I PMENTS (MAXROUTES, : LONG PAST)
,
& PEACEFAILURES (MAXROUTES, :LONGPAST)
& NUMASSETS , ROUTELOC ( MAXROUTES )
& ASSETLOC ( MAXASSETS )
,
& ASSETTYPE (MAXASSETS) , NUMASSETTYPES
& S, NEXT (MAXROUTES, MAXPOINTS)
,




CHARACTER * 1 METHODNAME ( MAXMETHODS
)
CHARACTER* 12 ROUTENAME (MAXROUTES
)
CHARACTER* 15 ASSETNAME (MAXASSETS



















& LATASSET , LONASSET
& DELR,DELRMIN, DELRLOW,
Sc BETA, ALPHA, RANGE, IPD, GUESS,
& CURRENTPHASE, DAYNOW, ENDTIME, NTRIAL,
& NEXTEVENTTY PE, NUMMETHODS, NUMPHASES,
& NUMROUTES , NUMSH I PMENT , NUMTRIALS
,







& NUMASSETS , ROUTELOC
,
& ASSETLOC,
& ASSETTY PE , NUMASSETTY PES
,
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